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Abstract
This paper discusses the problem of the optimal determination of
budget deficit limits in cases where the fiscal authority wishes to keep
the budget deficit close to a reference value. It is assumed that the
fiscal authority minimizes the expected discounted value of squared
deviations from the reference value. Lump-sum and proportional in-
tervention costs are considered. This paper is also an example of
integration between stochastic process optimal control methods and
the continuous time stochastic models. In fact, the characteristics of
the stochastic process that rules the path of the budget deficit are
taken from a previously developed continuous time stochastic model
(Amador, 1999). Finally, simulation methods are used in order to
conduct a comparative dynamics analysis. The paper concludes that,
in the case of proportional intervention costs, the optimal ceiling de-
pends positively on the cost parameter and on the variance of the
budget deficit. On the contrary, the optimal ceiling depends nega-
tively on the average budget deficit. These results remain valid in the
case where there are both lump-sum and proportional intervention
costs. Finally, in a stationary equilibrium context, we conclude that
economies with higher tax rates and lower public expenditure should
set higher budget deficit ceilings. The same is true for economies with
a higher variance in technology and public expenditure shocks.
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1 Introduction
The analysis of the behaviour of budget deficits has been a key issue in macro-
economic theory. In fact, the literature on the sustainability of the public
debt has always deserved special attention from the part of policy makers
and fiscal authorities. It has been argued that there is a large potential for
unsustainable budget deficit behaviour. This may be due to changes in the
structural parameters of the economy, such as tax rates, public expenditure
or the variance of shocks. Such concerns are stronger in the context of a
monetary union such as the one that is underway in the European Union. In
these cases, where there is a common, independent and low inflation oriented
central bank, budget deficit financing is more difficult. The fact is that indi-
vidual countries cannot finance the deficit through the issuing of new money.
In addition, individual countries cannot reduce the real value of public debt
through surprise inflation shocks. These restrictions to the financing of bud-
get deficits add to another type of risk. In monetary unions countries do
not hold any other major macroeconomic instrument other than the fiscal
policy. As a result, they may be tempted to use it in a non-sustainable way,
namely to promote short-run growth. If individual countries arrive at a sit-
uation where they can no longer finance the budget deficits, then they will
have to be bailed-out or abandon the monetary union. In the first case, the
credibility of the monetary union is put in danger. In fact, if any country
is bailed-out by a central authority, a moral hazard problem emerges. In
this situation other countries lack the incentives to keep their deficits under
control. In the second case, if a country exits the monetary union, the com-
mon bond market is seriously affected. In this situation investors tend to run
from public bonds, which leads to budgeting problems in the other countries.
Thus, it is vital to keep budget deficits under control in monetary unions.
This is the reason why the Maastricht Treaty has included two public
finance indicators in the set of nominal criteria that worked as pre-conditions
for the entry in the European Monetary Union. Namely, the budget deficit
should be lower than 3% of GDP and the public debt should be lower or
heading closely towards 60% of GDP. The risks that have been discussed
above are also the reason why the Stability and Growth Pact was signed.
The Pact states that the upper barrier of 3% of GDP is to be kept and
countries should make an effort to run a balanced budget. This would allow
some scope for adjustments when needed. In addition, financial penalties
were set to punish countries that repeatedly violate these constraints.
Nevertheless, there is no clear theoretical explanation for the choice of 3%
of GDP as the optimal value for the budget deficit constraint. Furthermore,
it can be questioned if this barrier is equally optimal for all countries or if
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it should depend on individual structural parameters and intervention costs.
There are several papers which discuss this problem. A short and necessarily
incomplete list includes Buiter, Corsetti and Roubini (1993), Alesina and
Bayoumi (1996), Corsetti and Roubini (1996), Obstfeld and Peri (1998) and
Perotti, Strauch and von Hagen (1998). Our paper examines the optimal
setting of budget deficit constraints in an economy where the fiscal author-
ity wishes to keep the deficit close to a reference value. Different types of
intervention costs are considered and smooth pasting techniques are used to
derive the solution.
This paper can also be taken as an example of integration between stochas-
tic process optimal control methods and the continuous time stochastic mod-
els. The smooth pasting techniques have been widely used in models of opti-
mal currency bands and speculative attacks. The key references in this area
are Krugman (1991) and Krugman and Miller (1992). However, these models
take the path of the exchange rate as a pre-defined stochastic process. In
some cases it is said that the stochastic process is the reduced form solution
of a non-specified model. In the same way, there is a class of continuous time
stochastic models, developed by Turnovsky (1995), which generates stochas-
tic processes as closed form solutions. This type of model is closely related
with the optimal portfolio literature, but is focused instead on macroeco-
nomic performance. Thus, there is scope for integration between the two
literatures. In our paper, the characteristics of the stochastic process that
rules the path of the budget deficit are taken from a previously developed
continuous time stochastic model (see Amador, 1999). Due to this, it is pos-
sible to establish some relationships between the structural parameters of the
economy and the optimal budget deficit rules.
The paper concludes that, in the case of proportional intervention costs,
the optimal ceiling is positively affected by the cost parameter and by the
variance of the deficit. On the contrary, the optimal ceiling is negatively
affected by the average budget deficit. It is shown that these results remain
valid in the case where there are both lump-sum and proportional interven-
tion costs. Finally, in a stationary equilibrium context, it is shown that
economies with higher tax rates and lower public expenditure should set
higher budget deficit ceilings. The same is true for economies facing a higher
variance in technology and public expenditure shocks.
The paper is divided into five sections. In the second section the problem
of the fiscal authority is presented. Then, in the third section, different
types of intervention costs are considered and the expressions for the optimal
budget deficit rules are obtained. Next, in the fourth section we simulate the
path of the budget deficit and a comparative dynamics analysis is presented.
Finally, in the fifth section the main results are gathered in a brief conclusion.
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2 The Problem Facing the Fiscal Authority
This section presents the problem of a fiscal authority whose concern is to
keep the budget deficit near an established reference value. It will be assumed
that the fiscal authority is concerned, not with the nominal budget deficit,
but with the budget deficit-average output ratio. This variable is defined as
dB
Y D
and it measures the relative weight of the budget deficit in the economy1.
It is also assumed that the fiscal authority aims to keep the budget deficit-
average output ratio as close as possible to zero. That means that the ob-
jective of the fiscal authority is to run balanced budgets. This assumption
is not restrictive. In fact, the model would be developed in the same way if
we chose any other reference value. In such cases, the budget deficit could
simply be measured in terms of deviations from the new reference value and
the calculations would be identical to those presented below. In addition, it
is assumed that the fiscal authority is increasingly worse-off the larger the
deviations are from the reference value.
Therefore, the objective function of the fiscal authority is the expected
discounted value of a payoff function, which depends on dB
Y D
, that is:
F
(
dB
Y D
)
= E
∫ ∞
0
f
(
dB
Y D
)
e−βtdt (1)
where f
(
dB
Y D
)
stands for the payoff function and β is an exogenous intertem-
poral discount rate. Moreover, the fact of having a fiscal authority which in-
creasingly dislikes larger budget deficits is included by assuming a quadratic
loss function. That is:
f
(
dB
Y D
)
=
(
dB
Y D
)2
(2)
At this point it is necessary to present the expression for the expected
present value of this particular quadratic payoff function. This expression is
presented by Dixit (1993) and we recall the main steps of its derivation in the
Appendix. As a matter of fact, the expected present value of the quadratic
payoff function is given by an expression of the type:
1Note that dB
Y D
is different from the definition of structural budget deficit. In our model,
the actual budget deficit dB is measured as a proportion of the average output. The total
output is given by a stochastic production function dY = αKdt + αKdy, where α is
a technological parameter, K is the capital stock in the economy and dy is a technology
shock with zero mean and variance σ2y. In this context, we simply consider that Y
D = αK.
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F(
dB
Y D
)
=
σ2
β2
+
2µ2
β3
+
2µ
(
dB
Y D
)
β2
+
(
dB
Y D
)2
β
+ (3)
Ae−a(
dB
YD
) +Beb(
dB
YD
)
where A and B are two constants to be determined afterwards, and a and b
are the roots of the Fundamental Quadratic of Brownian motion defined as:
ψ (λ) ≡ β − µλ− 1
2
σ2λ2 (4)
where, σ2and µ are respectively the variance and the growth rate of the
budget deficit-average output ratio. Additionally, through simple calculus,
it is possible to determine the roots of the fundamental quadratic defined by
equation 4. Note that since σ2 > 0 and ψ (0) = β > 0, there are certainly
two roots with opposite signs. These are:
a = − 1
σ2
(
µ+
√
µ2 + 2σ2β
)
< 0 (2.5)
b = − 1
σ2
(
µ−
√
µ2 + 2σ2β
)
> 0 (2.6)
Finally, it is necessary to guarantee that the expected present value
F
(
dB
Y D
)
is finite. This issue is discussed in the Appendix, where we also
explain the meaning of the fundamental quadratic.
The next section presents the conditions that define the optimum limits
for the budget deficit. These conditions depend on the form of the pay-
off function, on the characteristics of the stochastic process that regulates
the budget deficit and on the type of intervention costs faced by the fiscal
authority when trying to regulate it.
3 Optimal Limits for the Budget Deficit
In the previous section we presented the expression for the expected dis-
counted welfare loss of budget deficits, given the assumed quadratic payoff
function of the fiscal authority. Nevertheless, it is shown in the Appendix
A that, in the case of an uncontrolled budget deficit, the last two terms of
equation 3 are not necessary to define F
(
dB
Y D
)
. In such a case we would have
A = B = 0. However, in the presence of a fiscal authority which aims at
controlling the budget deficit, these constants are not zero and depend on
the intervention costs faced by the fiscal authority. In the next subsection
we describe these costs.
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3.1 Intervention Costs
The intervention costs faced by the fiscal authority when it affects the normal
path of the budget deficit are assumed to be given by:
C = C − c.d
(
dB
Y D
)
(6)
where C and c are cost parameters.
The cost function above contains both lump-sum and proportional inter-
vention costs. At this point, we briefly discuss the rationale for considering
these two types of intervention costs. Firstly, we consider the lump-sum
component C. The existence of such a cost, which is independent of the size
of the intervention, can be interpreted as a loss of credibility faced by the
fiscal authority when it needs to intervene on the budget deficit. The second
component c.d
(
dB
Y D
)
states that the costs faced by the fiscal authority are
proportional to the size of the interventions. In fact, a unitary negative devi-
ation in the budget deficit-average output ratio implies an intervention cost
of c. This is a realistic assumption because the welfare of the fiscal author-
ity is certainly linked to macroeconomic performance. In fact, to implement
downward corrections in the budget deficit is a contractionary policy, which
reduces growth and employment. Unfortunately, recessions are themselves
a cause of bad budget deficit performance. This is due to the effect of au-
tomatic stabilisers. In this sense, the stronger the downward intervention
in the budget deficit, the larger the negative effect on the economy and the
larger the costs faced by the fiscal authority.
3.2 Value Matching and Smooth Pasting Conditions
After having introduced the basic assumptions of the problem, it is now
possible to determine the optimal limits for the budget deficit. Essentially,
what we do next is the optimal control of the Brownian motion that describes
the path of the budget deficit. We proceed in two steps. First, we assume
exogenous limits for the budget deficit. In this case, the main point is to
understand what the fiscal authority does when the limits are reached. This
is the role played by the value matching conditions. A second and more
interesting step is to consider that the limits are endogenous and optimally
set by the fiscal authority. In this case it is necessary to know, not only
how to intervene when the limits are reached, but also where they should be
placed. In this second step the smooth pasting conditions are used.
It is empirically difficult to find fiscal authorities that deal with excessive
budget surpluses. In fact, budget surpluses are rare events so we will assume
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that there are only ceilings to the budget deficit. This assumption automat-
ically sets the constant A equal to zero. In fact, if there is no floor and we
take dB
Y D
as being highly negative, it is reasonable to expect that it will not
reach the ceiling during the period of analysis. Therefore, F (x) would be the
expected discounted value of the uncontrolled stochastic process. However,
taking equation 3 and making dB
Y D
→ −∞ we would have F ( dB
Y D
) → +∞.
This lack of consistency can only be solved by setting A = 0.
3.2.1 Value Matching Conditions
The fact of having considered a lump-sum component in the cost function,
makes it optimum for the fiscal authority to reset the budget deficit to a lower
value when the ceiling is reached. In fact, it is not optimum to continuously
intervene near the ceiling because the lump-sum cost must be faced in each
intervention. Nevertheless, it may not be optimum to reset the budget deficit
to zero. In fact, there is a second component in the intervention cost that
depends on the size of the intervention. Thus, if we define the ceiling as u
and the value of the budget deficit after resetting as r, the following condition
must be verified:
F (u)− F (r) = C + c(u− r) (7)
which, using equation 3, is equivalent to:
2µ (u− r)
β2
+
u2 − r2
β
+B
(
ebu − ebr) = C + c(u− r) (8)
3.2.2 Smooth Pasting Conditions
In addition, F
(
dB
Y D
)
is positively affected by the constant B, which depends
on parameters u and r. Therefore, these parameters must be chosen so that
Bu = Br = 0. Then, differentiating equation 8 in order to r and u and
substituting the conditions above, we obtain:
2µ
β2
+
2r
β
+ bBebr = c (9)
2µ
β2
+
2u
β
+ bBebu = c (10)
These are the smooth pasting conditions and can be generically written
as: F
′
(r) = F
′
(u) = c.
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3.3 Optimal Limit Analysis
In the previous subsections we have presented the value matching and the
smooth pasting conditions. As noted above, the optimum barriers must verify
these conditions, which is equivalent to saying that it is necessary to solve the
system formed by equations 8, 9 and 10, where u, r and B are the unknowns.
However, this is a three-equation non-linear system, which is almost always
impossible to solve explicitly. Therefore, in the next section, we proceed with
the numerical solution of the system. Meanwhile, we examine the special case
where there are just proportional intervention costs.
In fact, this special case allows us to obtain a closed form solution for
the optimal budget deficit ceiling. The same is not true for the case where
there are just lump-sum intervention costs. As pointed-out, when there are
no lump-sum costs it is optimal to continuously intervene at the ceiling. In
this case the value matching condition is just:
F
′
(u) = c (11)
that is:
2µ
β2
+
2u
β
+ bBebu = c (12)
As expected, the limit is placed such that the increase in welfare from
intervening, measured by F
′
(u), equals the marginal cost of intervention c.
As discussed, it is also true that Bu = 0. Thus, using this condition and
differentiating equation 12 in order to u, we obtain:
2
β
+ b2Bebu = 0 (13)
which is equivalent to F
′′
(u) = 0. This is analogous to the smooth pasting
condition and it is known in the literature as the super contact condition.
For more details see Dumas (1991). Next, putting together equations 12 and
13 it is possible to write:
u =
β
2
(
2
bβ
+ c− 2µ
β2
)
(14)
which, using equation 2.6, can be rewritten as:
u = − σ
2
µ−√(µ2 + 2σ2β) + β2 c− µβ (15)
At this point it is important to examine equation 15, and see how the
optimal ceiling depends on the intervention cost parameter (c), on the trend
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of the budget deficit (µ) and on the variance of the deficit (σ2). Recall that
we are just considering the existence of proportional intervention costs. As
observed, the consideration of other types of intervention costs does not allow
for the determination of the optimal limit as a closed form expression such
as 15.
The effect on the optimal ceiling of an increase in the marginal interven-
tion cost is given by:
∂u
∂c
=
β
2
> 0 (16)
which is always positive. An increase in parameter c means that the fiscal
authority faces higher costs when it intervenes and these costs are higher
the larger the intervention. Thus, taking the other things constant, if it is
costlier to reach the ceiling, then it is optimal to reach it less often or to
reach it later in time. This means that u should be set at a higher value.
The effect of an increase in the growth rate of the budget deficit µ is given
by:
∂u
∂µ
=
1− µ (µ2 + 2σ2β)− 12
1
σ2
(
µ−√(µ2 + 2σ2β))2 −
1
β
(17)
which, does not have a definite sign. However, considering the range of rea-
sonable values for the parameters, this derivative is clearly negative. In fact,
when the budget deficit grows faster, the marginal decrease in the welfare
of the fiscal authority, given by ∂F/∂t, is also higher. Therefore, given the
marginal intervention cost, it is optimal to intervene sooner, which is equiv-
alent to saying that the optimal ceiling should be set at a lower level.
Finally, we examine the effect of an increase in the variance of the budget
deficit σ2. This effect is given by the derivative:
∂u
∂σ2
= −µ−
√
(µ2 + 2σ2β) + σ2β (µ2 + 2σ2β)
− 1
2(
µ−√(µ2 + 2σ2β))2 (18)
which is positive, for the range of acceptable values for the parameters.
Therefore, it is optimal to set the ceiling at a higher level. There are two
effects leading to this result. Firstly, an increase in parameter σ2 means that,
for each u, the average size of interventions is higher. As we have said, this
translates into higher intervention costs. Secondly, the benefit of intervening
when a negative shock occurs is smaller. In fact, a higher σ2 means that a
strong increase in the budget deficit tends to be reverted in the next period.
Therefore, the optimal u is higher.
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In the next section we develop a comparative dynamics analysis in order
to examine the more interesting case where there are both proportional and
lump-sum intervention costs.
4 Comparative Dynamics
In this section we present different macroeconomic scenarios, illustrating
economies with different characteristics. Each of these different scenarios
is associated with a different calibration for the model. This allows for the
numerical solution of the non-linear system of equations that defines the
optimal limit in the case of mixed proportional and lump-sum intervention
costs. This section is divided into three subsections. First, we compare
two economies with different intervention costs. Then, we make use of a
previously developed continuous time stochastic model (Amador, 1999) to
examine the effects of public expenditure and taxation on the optimal bud-
get deficit rules. Finally, the same thing is carried out for changes in the
variance of technology and public expenditure shocks. As mentioned in the
beginning, this paper is an example of integration between the stochastic
process optimal control methods and the continuous time stochastic models.
At this point this sentence is clearer. In fact, the continuous time stochastic
model presents the effects of public expenditure, taxation and uncertainty on
the behaviour of the deficit. Then, taking the trend and the variance of the
deficit, and making use of the methods described above, the optimal deficit
rules are determined.
4.1 The Effects of Changing Intervention Costs
This subsection takes equations 8, 9 and 10, and examines the effects of
different intervention costs on the optimal budget deficit limits. To this
purpose we introduce Economy 1 and Economy 2 in the two tables, below.
Each table contains the values of the exogenous and endogenous parame-
ters in the model. The parameters in the first row, namely α (average rate of
return on capital), β (intertemporal discount rate), g (proportion of public
expenditure on output), τ (tax rate on output), σ2y (variance of technology
shocks) and σ2z (variance of expenditure shocks) are exogenous
2.They en-
2The covariance between the two types of shocks is assumed to be zero. This is not a
restrictive assumption. In fact, it is possible to examine the effects of such an exogenous
parameter on the path of the budget deficit. See Amador (1999). We have also assumed
the same intertemporal discount rate β for the representative consumer and the fiscal
authority.
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Parameter α β g τ σ2y σ
2
z
Value 0.15 0.05 0.25 0.35 0.01 0.01
Parameter C c µ σ2 u r
Value 0.0001 0.9 0.094 0.0017 0.0508 0.0124
Table 1: Economy 1
Parameter α β g τ σ2y σ
2
z
Value 0.15 0.05 0.25 0.35 0.01 0.01
Parameter C c µ σ2 u r
Value 0.0002 2.5 0.094 0.0017 0.0833 0.0349
Table 2: Economy 2
dogenously determine µ (trend of the budget deficit-average output ratio)
and σ2 (variance of the budget deficit-average output ratio). These relation-
ships are obtained from the previously mentioned continuous time stochastic
model. Then, the parameters µ and σ2, together with the intervention cost
parameters C (lump-sum cost) and c (proportional cost), are used to obtain
the numerical solution of the non-linear system of equations that defines the
optimal budget deficit limit. As a result, parameters u (ceiling for the budget
deficit) and r (budget deficit after resetting) are endogenously determined.
The value for parameter B, which is also an unknown in the three-equation
non-linear system, is not presented in the table because it is of no interest
io our analysis. Note that the values chosen for the exogenous parameters
do not describe any particular economy. Nevertheless, they provide realistic
results for the endogenous variables3. Our objective is to compare different
scenarios and not to simulate any particular economy.
The two economies described in tables 4.1 and 4.2 are identical in all
aspects except for the costs faced by the fiscal authority when trying to affect
the budget deficit. In fact, Economy 2 presents larger values for parameters
C and c than does Economy 1. Due to this, the optimal values for parameters
u and r are different. In fact, Economy 2 presents a higher optimal ceiling
and a higher resetting value.
3There is no clear way of measuring the lump-sum and proportional costs faced by
the fiscal authority when it intervenes to control the budget deficit. Part of these costs
are clearly subjective. The same is true for the form of the payoff function of the fiscal
authority. Therefore, we have chosen to calibrate parameters C and c in such a way that
the endogenous variables present realistic values in terms of magnitude.
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Nevertheless, the absolute difference between the ceiling and the reset-
ting value is greater in Economy 2 than in Economy 1. This means that
the adjustment in the budget deficit when the ceiling is reached is greater
in Economy 2. The intuition for these results is clear. As was seen, the
smooth pasting conditions state that, at the optimum, there is equality be-
tween marginal costs and marginal benefits of intervention. Therefore, an
increase in the marginal intervention cost c must be matched by an increase
in marginal benefits, which can only come about through a higher ceiling
u. Next, we explain the reason why the resetting adjustment is greater in
Economy 2. The value matching condition holds the answer to this ques-
tion. It has been demonstrated that the total benefit of the intervention,
measured in terms of the gain in the payoff function of the fiscal authority,
should equal the total costs of intervention. Therefore, for reasonable values
of the parameters, an increase in the lump-sum costs leads to an increase
in the optimal difference between u and r, as a way of increasing the total
gains of intervention. In fact, the higher the lump-sum cost C, the larger the
resetting adjustment that is made. This is a way of reducing the frequency of
adjustments, which means saving on the intervention costs. Figure 4.1 plots
the results that we have been discussing. Finally, we discuss the path of the
accumulated intervention costs curve. As a matter of fact, the accumulated
intervention costs rise later in Economy 2 but build up faster through time.
On the one hand, Economy 2 presents a higher ceiling which makes it normal
that interventions take longer to occur. On the other hand, when interven-
tions begin to occur, costs rise faster because parameters C and c are higher
in Economy 2.
4.2 The Effects of Public Expenditure and Taxation
In this subsection we turn to the case of two economies that are different
in terms of public expenditure and taxation parameters. In this context,
Economy 3 presents a lower tax rate and a higher public expenditure-average
output ratio than does Economy 4. Tables 4.3 and 4.4 describe these two
scenarios.
As explained in Amador (1999), the stationary equilibrium budget deficit
is smaller in the economy that follows a less rigorous fiscal policy. As a
matter of fact, the stationary equilibrium budget deficit must be smaller in
order to allow for a slower rate of public debt accumulation. Only a relatively
lower stock of public debt can compensate the effects of a less rigorous fiscal
policy and ensure the sustainability of the budget deficit. In addition, it can
also be seen that Economy 3 endogenously generates a lower variance for
the budget deficit. Next, we turn to the consequences of these two scenarios
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Parameter α β g τ σ2y σ
2
z
Value 0.15 0.05 0.25 0.3 0.05 0.05
Parameter C c µ σ2 u r
Value 0.0001 0.9 0.045 0.0015 0.0541 0.0238
Table 3: Economy 3
Parameter α β g τ σ2y σ
2
z
Value 0.15 0.05 0.2 0.4 0.05 0.05
Parameter C c µ σ2 u r
Value 0.0001 0.9 0.158 0.0323 0.1447 0.0986
Table 4: Economy 4
in terms of the optimal budget deficit limits. An examination of Tables
4.3 and 4.4 reveals that Economy 4 presents a higher optimal ceiling and
resetting value. It is important to understand this result. Some of the effects
at work were discussed above in subsection 3.3 when the case of proportional
intervention costs was considered. Firstly, it was remarked that the higher
the budget deficit growth rate, the lower the optimal ceiling. Secondly, we
concluded that the higher the variance of the budget deficit, the higher the
optimal ceiling. In this section, the existence of lump-sum intervention costs
adds some extra effects to the analysis. In the first place, the existence of
lump-sum intervention costs reinforces the case for a higher optimal ceiling
when the variance of the deficit is greater. In fact, the costs of responding to
shocks, which tend to be reversed in the next period, are higher. Therefore,
costs and benefits of intervention only equalize when the optimal ceiling is set
at a higher value. In the second place, the lump-sum costs are by themselves
a motive for higher ceilings. The lump-sum costs are something to be paid
every time the budget deficit exceeds the ceiling. For each budget deficit
growth rate, such events become more frequent as time goes by. Therefore,
it is optimal to wait until the benefits of intervention are higher, which is
equivalent to saying that the limit is set at a higher value. In our case, despite
facing a higher µ, Economy 4 presents a higher limit because its σ2 is also
higher.
These results are robust to different calibrations and state that, in the sta-
tionary equilibrium, higher tax rates or lower public expenditure correspond
to higher optimal limits. Figure 4.2 illustrates this result.
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Parameter α β g τ σ2y σ
2
z
Value 0.15 0.05 0.25 0.35 0.02 0.02
Parameter C c µ σ2 u r
Value 0.0001 0.9 0.092 0.0033 0.0595 0.0212
Table 5: Economy 5
Parameter α β g τ σ2y σ
2
z
Value 0.15 0.05 0.25 0.35 0.001 0.001
Parameter C c µ σ2 u r
Value 0.0001 0.9 0.095 0.0002 0.0429 0.0044
Table 6: Economy 6
4.3 The Effects of Technology and Public Expenditure
Shocks
The analysis of differences in the variance of technology and public expen-
diture shocks is similar to that presented in the previous subsection. Thus,
Tables 4.5 and 4.6 describe two different scenarios. In this case Economy 5
faces a variance of technology and public expenditure shocks that is higher
than that of Economy 6. In addition, the covariance between the two types
of shocks is assumed to be zero. The differences between these two economies
endogenously generate a lower variance and a slightly higher trend for the
budget deficit in Economy 6. As a consequence, this economy presents a
lower optimal ceiling and a correspondingly lower resetting value. In conclu-
sion it can be said that, the lower the volatility faced by the economies, the
lower their optimal ceiling and resetting value. Figure 4.3 illustrates these
results.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this section we briefly sum up the main results of the paper and discuss
its limitations. As stated in the introduction, the paper uses the stochastic
optimal control techniques to examine what it is that is behind the deter-
mination of optimal limits for the budget deficit. Furthermore, we make
use of a previously developed continuous time stochastic model in order to
establish the links between the structural parameters of the economy and
these optimal limits. In this context, some interesting results are obtained.
Firstly, in the case of proportional intervention costs, we conclude that the
higher the cost parameter, the higher is the optimal value for the budget
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deficit ceiling. The same is true for greater variances of the budget deficit.
On the contrary, the higher the average budget deficit, the lower the optimal
limit. Secondly, in a stationary equilibrium context with both proportional
and lump-sum intervention costs, we conclude that economies with higher
tax rates and lower public expenditure should set higher budget deficit lim-
its than less rigorous ones. Finally, the higher the volatility affecting the
economy in the stationary equilibrium, the higher the optimal budget deficit
ceiling will be.
There are two types of limitations in our analysis. Firstly, it is very
difficult to know what the magnitude of the intervention cost faced by the
fiscal authority is. Additional research work can be done to link these costs
to the structural parameters in the economy. Secondly, our analysis pre-
supposes the knowledge of the stochastic process that rules the path of the
budget deficit. To this purpose, we used a previously derived continuous time
stochastic model. However, this model only describes the path of the deficit
in the stationary equilibrium. Therefore, part of our results apply only to the
stationary equilibrium context and not to cases where the deficit is following
an unsustainable path.
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Figure 4.2: Economy 3 (-)   Economy 4 (--)
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Figure 4.3: Economy 5 (-)   Economy 6 (--)
0 50 100 150
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
Budget Deficit
0 50 100 150
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
Budget Deficit with Intervention
0 50 100 150
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
Intervention
time
0 50 100 150
0
1
2
3
4
5
Accumulated Interv. Costs
time
A Appendix
This appendix presents the main steps of the method used by Dixit (1993) to
derive the solution of the differential equation that represents the expected
present value of a quadratic payoff function. In this context, we also try to
explain the meaning of the fundamental quadratic equation 4.
We start by observing that the expected present value function F (x) can
be decomposed as:
F (x) = f(x)dt+ e−βdtE[F (x+ dx)] (19)
Note that in this appendix we define x as a Brownian motion stochastic
process with mean µ and variance σ2. In order to simplify the notation, we
will not use the random variable dB
Y D
, which has a specific meaning in the
model. Simplifying equation 19 and ignoring the terms of order higher than
dt, which go to zero when dt→ 0, we have:
F (x) = f(x)dt+ (1− βdt) (F (x) + {E [F (x+ dx)]− F (x)}) (20)
= f(x)dt+ F (x)− βF (x)dt+ {E [F (x+ dx)]− F (x)} (21)
Thus:
βF (x) dt = f(x)dt+ {E [F (x+ dx)]− F (x)} (22)
= f(x)dt+ E [dF ] (23)
Making use of Itoˆ’s Lemma, we rewrite:
E [dF (x)] = µF
′
(x)dt+
1
2
σ2F
′′
(x)dt (24)
Substituting equation 24 in 23 and dividing by dt, we obtain:
1
2
σ2F
′′
(x) + µF
′
(x)− βF (x) + f(x) = 0 (25)
The next step is to obtain the solution of the non-homogeneous linear dif-
ferential equation above. The solution consists of the sum of the complemen-
tary function and the particular integral. As is known, the complementary
function is the general solution of the homogeneous part of equation 25:
1
2
σ2F
′′
(x) + µF
′
(x)− βF (x) = 0 (26)
The general solution of equation 26 is just the linear combination of two
independent solutions. If we try a solution of the type exp (λx) we obtain:
exp (λx)
[
1
2
σ2λ2 + µλ− β
]
= 0 (27)
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which can only be true if:
1
2
σ2λ2 + µλ− β = 0 (28)
The interesting point is that this equation generates as solutions the roots
of the fundamental quadratic that was introduced above. Therefore, we
obtain the values for a and b that were defined in equations 2.5 and 2.6. As it
was also said, these roots are different and have opposite signs. Consequently,
they are independent and the general solution of equation 26 is simply:
Ae−ax +Bebx (29)
where A and B are constants to be determined.
At this point it is important to explain the meaning of the fundamental
quadratic equation 4. The expected present value of the exponential payoff
function can be rewritten as:
F (x) =
∫ ∞
0
E
[
exp (λx) e−βtdt
]
(30)
= exp (λx)
∫ ∞
0
exp
[
−
(
β − λµ− 1
2
λ2σ2
)
t
]
dt (31)
=
exp (λx)
β − λµ− 1
2
λ2σ2
(32)
Therefore, for the integral to converge, the denominator must be positive.
This means that the fundamental quadratic determines the values for which
the problem is valid.
Taking equation 25 again, we now turn to the determination of the par-
ticular integral. Given our flow payoff f (x) = x2, the right guess for the
particular integral is:
F (x) =
2∑
m=0
amx
m (33)
Substituting this expression in 25 we obtain:
σ2a2 + µ (a1 + 2a2x)− β
(
a0 + a1x+ a2x
2
)
+ x2 = 0 (34)
Next, equating the coefficient of each power of x to zero, it is possible
to determine the expressions for a0, a1 and a2. Therefore, we obtain the
following three conditions:
σ2a2 + µa1 − βa0 = 0 (35)
2µa2 − βa1 = 0 (36)
−βa2 + 1 = 0 (37)
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that is:
a0 =
σ2
β2
+
2µ2
β3
(38)
a1 =
2µ
β2
(39)
a2 =
1
β
(40)
Substituting these parameters back into equation 33, the particular inte-
gral becomes:
F (x) =
σ2
β2
+
2µ2
β3
+
2µ
β2
x+
1
β
x2 (41)
Finally, taking the sum of the general solution and the particular inte-
gral, we obtain the solution of the of the non-homogeneous linear differential
equation 25. That is:
F (x) =
σ2
β2
+
2µ2
β3
+
2µ
β2
x+
1
β
x2 + Ae−ax +Bebx (42)
which is similar to equation 3 presented in the text of the paper.
There is an alternative method for obtaining the expected present value
of the quadratic payoff function. We will present this second method briefly
because it provides an additional important result.
Taking again the flow payoff of the type exp (λx) we can expand and
rewrite:
F (x) = E
[∫ ∞
0
∞∑
n=0
1
n!
(λxt)
n e−βtdt |xo = x
]
(43)
=
∞∑
n=0
λn
n!
E
[∫ ∞
0
xnt e
−βtdt |xo = x
]
(44)
In a similar way, equation 32 can also be expanded in powers of λ, in the
neighbourhood of λ = 0. First, note that:
exp (λx) =
∞∑
n=0
1
n!
(λx)n (45)[
β − λµ− 1
2
λ2σ2
]−1
=
1
β
∞∑
n=0
β−n
(
λµ+
1
2
λ2σ2
)n
(46)
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Then, using the Binomial Theorem, it is possible to rewrite equation 32 as:
F (x) =
( ∞∑
n=0
1
n!
(λx)n
)(
1
β
∞∑
n=0
β−n
n∑
j=0
(
n
j
)
(λn)j
(
1
2
λ2σ2
)n−j)
(47)
At this point, equating the powers n = 2 in 44 and 47 we obtain again:
F (x) =
σ2
β2
+
2µ2
β3
+
2µ
β2
x+
1
β
x2 (48)
which means that the solution of the differential equation 25 is simply the
particular integral. Therefore, the constants A and B are zero for the case
of the uncontrolled Brownian motion with a quadratic payoff function.
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